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Health insurance exchanges as established under 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) must engage in five core functions: determine 
eligibility for federal subsidies or public coverage, 
enroll consumers and employees into qualified 
health coverage (or connect eligible individuals with 
Medicaid and CHIP), conduct plan management, 
provide consumer assistance, and perform financial 
management. This paper focuses on just one of 
these core functions: the series of oversight activities 
that federal officials have called “plan management.”
States face three choices: establish their own exchange 
and exercise control over plan management functions, 
allow the federal government to establish a federally 
facilitated exchange (FFE) but enter into a partnership 
arrangement to perform plan management, or cede all 
plan management functions to the FFE. With the latter 
two approaches, the state will essentially turn over to the 
federal government some of its traditional authority to 
regulate its private health insurance markets. However, 
through a partnership arrangement, state regulators can 
recapture that authority and oversight.
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) has defined plan management to encompass a broad 
range of functions, including certifying qualified health 
plans (QHPs), collecting and reviewing rate and benefit 
information, managing contracts with QHPs, monitoring 
ongoing compliance issues, recertifying and decertifying 
QHPs, and running an open enrollment process. Certifying 
QHPs involves reviewing plans’ adherence to a set of 
criteria related to provider networks, marketing practices, 
quality, and transparency. In addition, to protect exchanges 
from adverse selection, states will need to conduct ongoing 
market analysis of the products and prices carriers offer 
inside and outside the exchange.
In order to better understand the capacity for plan 
management in the states, we review their current 
regulation of plans in their commercial marketplaces 
and Medicaid programs. To help inform our review, we 
evaluate the regulatory structure in six states: Arizona, 
Minnesota, New York, Tennessee, Washington, and 
Wisconsin. In addition, because the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) may be responsible for 
plan management for some FFEs, we assess CMS’ 
experience running Medicare Advantage, a federal 
program providing Medicare beneficiaries with private 
health plan choices. This paper is not, however, a 
comprehensive evaluation of all the plan management 
functions defined by HHS. Instead, we focus on a subset 
of plan management activities most closely analogous 
to what state and federal regulators are currently doing: 
granting licenses and ensuring solvency, assessing network 
adequacy, reviewing rates and policy forms, regulating 
marketing practices, improving plan quality, and 
conducting ongoing oversight.
Based on our findings, we conclude that exchanges’ plan 
management responsibilities represent a considerable 
expansion of states’ oversight of insurers. The law requires 
oversight that in some cases expands on what states 
currently do and in other cases represents a wholly new 
activity. However, to fulfill their responsibilities, state 
exchanges can leverage the authority and skills of multiple 
state agencies, including departments of insurance, 
departments of health, and Medicaid agencies. 
In addition, the entity ultimately responsible for plan 
management, whether at the state or federal level, will 
need to balance the ACA’s requirements for greater 
front-end review of carriers and plans with the need to 
develop a management process that supports and sustains 
an adequate mix of quality carriers to serve consumers 
in the exchange. This will be particularly true for the 
small business exchange (SHOP), in which there are 
limited incentives for health plans to participate. For the 
individual market exchange, the incentives to participate 
are stronger and plans will be less deterred by a robust 
review and approval process.
Key Findings
  • Confirming licensure and solvency. QHPs must 
be state-licensed and “in good standing” with state 
departments of insurance (DOI). While the status of 
insurers’ licenses is public information, exchanges, 
including FFEs, will either need the cooperation of the 
DOI to determine whether an insurer is subject to any 
enforcement actions by the state or require insurers to 
attest to their good standing.
  • Network adequacy. While some states have network 
adequacy requirements for commercial insurers, many 
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do not. And those that do have standards generally 
apply them only to health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs). Medicaid and Medicare Advantage 
plans must submit to up front scrutiny on network 
adequacy, as well as ongoing oversight. Where a state 
does not currently have a network adequacy standard 
for commercial health plans, the exchange could rely 
on a general standard HHS has prescribed through 
regulation, or they could import some or all of the 
standards used for Medicaid plans. For a FFE run by 
CMS, the agency could require carriers to attest to 
network adequacy, rely on the state DOI to certify 
compliance, or leverage the standards and process used 
in Medicare Advantage.
  • Benefit and rate review. The ACA includes sweeping 
insurance reforms that affect all new individual and 
small group plans, not just exchange plans. Most 
DOIs have experience reviewing health insurance 
policies to assess whether they include a required set 
of benefits, but they generally do not have experience 
reviewing benefit packages for actuarial equivalence 
against a benchmark, or determining whether a 
particular benefit design discriminates against higher 
risk individuals. They also do not currently assess 
plans’ actuarial value. Many states will need to build 
this capacity in order to meet ACA requirements. 
While CMS has much of this kind of experience in 
Medicare Advantage, to perform this activity for FFEs 
it would have to expand capacity, rely on attestations 
from insurers, or obtain cooperation from state DOIs.
  • Marketing regulation. Of the six states we reviewed, 
none have a comprehensive prior assessment and 
approval process for commercial plans’ marketing 
materials before they are used. Conversely, state 
Medicaid agencies must conduct prior approval 
of all marketing materials and activities, while 
CMS requires Medicare Advantage plans to file all 
marketing materials with the agency and conducts 
extensive post-market surveillance to ensure plans are 
not using improper sales techniques. State exchanges 
will need to coordinate with their DOI to determine 
a common marketing standard for QHPs, and decide 
the process by which they will review materials for 
certification. CMS, in operating a FFE, will need 
to establish an appropriate marketing standard and 
process for reviewing materials, but will need to be 
cognizant of each state’s regulatory environment.
  • Quality improvement. Very few states have imposed 
quality improvement, care coordination, or performance 
reporting requirements on private health insurance 
plans, although some have imposed quality-related 
obligations on HMOs. Expectations for plans’ efforts 
to improve quality are far more entrenched in Medicaid 
and Medicare Advantage. As a result, state exchanges 
will likely find their Medicaid agency to be a source of 
expertise, while CMS can look to Medicare Advantage 
for experience setting quality standards, collecting and 
evaluating quality data, and rating plan performance.
  • Ongoing oversight. State exchanges will likely 
want to rely on their DOI for at least some ongoing 
oversight of QHPs. Most DOIs have a built-in 
infrastructure – consumer complaint hotlines and 
databases, an ability to identify and analyze trends, 
and staff to conduct market conduct exams, all of 
which an exchange could leverage in order to meet 
its oversight obligations. However, DOIs may be 
understaffed and underfunded, and the exchange may 
need to help finance a QHP oversight program. CMS, 
in operating a FFE, will want to rely on DOIs as well, 
particularly for information relating to consumer 
complaints about QHPs and the results of any market 
conduct exams of carriers offering QHPs. However, 
if the state is unwilling or unable to assist CMS in its 
oversight responsibilities, the agency will need to build 
the necessary capacity.
The above activities represent only a portion of the 
plan management responsibilities for exchanges. 
However, exchange officials do not need to build a plan 
management infrastructure from scratch. Within the 
state, whether at the DOI, department of health (DOH), 
or Medicaid agency, there likely resides an existing 
infrastructure for communicating with insurers, setting 
state standards for consumer protection, and collecting 
and evaluating data to perform oversight.
While CMS, in its operation of plan management for 
FFEs, has an existing infrastructure it can draw upon, 
there are dramatic differences in the regulatory approach 
taken by the agency and that of state insurance regulators 
working with private health insurers. CMS will likely 
want to rely on state regulators to help the FFE engage 
directly with insurers, share information and data about 
insurers’ status within a state and, at a minimum, perform 
their conventional state role of oversight and consumer 
assistance to ensure that all insurers, whether inside or 
outside an exchange, are meeting consumers’ needs.
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Health insurance exchanges are often called the lynchpin 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s 
(ACA) provisions to expand access to quality, affordable 
coverage.1 As the gateways for people to find and purchase 
federally subsidized commercial coverage, exchanges 
must engage in five core functions: determine eligibility 
for federal subsidies or public coverage, enroll consumers 
and employees into qualified health coverage (or connect 
eligible individuals with Medicaid and the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP)), conduct plan 
management, provide consumer assistance, and perform 
financial management. This paper focuses on just one 
of those core areas – the series of oversight functions 
that federal regulators refer to as “plan management.”2 
This concept encompasses a wide range of activities, 
such as setting standards for plan participation in the 
exchange; communicating those standards to insurance 
carriers; reviewing data from the insurance carriers to 
assess adherence to the relevant standards and plans’ 
eligibility for the exchanges; determining plans’ continued 
compliance with exchange standards; and conducting 
market analysis of prices and products inside and outside 
the exchanges, in order to recognize and respond to 
potential adverse selection. 
An exchange’s development and execution of a plan 
management strategy will depend on a number of 
factors, not the least of which is whether the exchange 
is run by the state or run by the federal government 
through a federally facilitated exchange (FFE). Under 
an FFE arrangement, states can choose to have the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
operate plan management for the FFE, or the state 
can perform the plan management functions under a 
partnership arrangement.3 States thus have three options 
regarding plan management: establish and run their own 
exchange and exercise control over plan management 
functions, allow the federal government to establish an 
FFE but enter into a partnership agreement to perform 
plan management, or cede all plan management functions 
to the FFE. 
Whichever approach is chosen will have significant 
consequences for the relationship between the state and 
federal government. With the latter two approaches, the 
state will essentially cede to the federal government some 
of its traditional authority to regulate its private health 
insurance markets.4 However, through a partnership 
arrangement, state regulators can recapture that authority 
and oversight. Whichever option a state chooses, 
there will need to be a minimum level of coordination 
between state and federal regulators. And for states that 
choose to take on the plan management responsibilities 
themselves, there will also need to be an unprecedented 
amount of coordination among state agencies, including 
the exchange, the department of insurance (DOI), and, 
in some cases, the state Medicaid agency or a separate 
department responsible for regulating closed network 
plans like health maintenance organizations (HMOs). 
This paper evaluates the plan management functions for 
exchanges, as prescribed by the ACA, and reviews current 
systems of plan management at the state and federal levels. 
It builds on an earlier report for the National Academy 
of Social Insurance (NASI) by Deborah Bachrach and 
Patti Boozang, which evaluated the full range of exchange 
functions under FFE and partnership arrangements.5
In order to better understand the capacity for plan 
management in the states, we first introduce the new 
requirements ushered in under the ACA and review 
how states currently regulate plans in their commercial 
marketplaces and in their Medicaid programs. We then 
evaluate what existing skills and resources exchanges can 
use to perform plan management activities, and discuss 
where capacity may need to be built or expanded. This 
analysis focuses on how the exchange plan management 
functions can be supported by states’ existing regulatory 
infrastructure, as well as areas in which states may need 
to build capacity to perform the necessary oversight. 
Because it is likely that a significant number of states 
will not partner with the federal government on plan 
management, we also identify how plan management 
could be shaped by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services’ (CMS) experience in managing plans 
in Medicare Part C (the Medicare Advantage program) 
and the implications of having CMS conduct what 
traditionally has been the role of state regulators.6
To help inform our review, we have examined private 
insurance regulation and interviewed insurance regulators 
Introduction
With the latter two approaches the state will 
essentially cede to the federal government 
some of its traditional authority to regulate 
its private health insurance markets.
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in six states: Arizona, Minnesota, New York, Tennessee, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. These states were chosen for 
two primary reasons. First, we were able to benefit from 
Bachrach and colleagues’ extensive review of Medicaid 
managed care contracts in each of these states and her 
report analyzing their oversight of Medicaid plans.7 
Second, these states take diverse approaches to their 
regulatory oversight of commercial carriers, allowing us to 
gain a better understanding of the wide range of authority 
and tools available to state insurance regulators. 
Exchange Plan Management: “Not Your Grandma’s Rate Review”8
HHS’ guidance to states has defined plan management 
as encompassing a broad range of functions, including 
certifying QHPs, collecting and reviewing rate and 
benefit information, managing contracts with QHPs, 
monitoring ongoing compliance issues, recertifying and 
decertifying QHPs, and running an open enrollment 
process.9 In addition, to protect exchanges from adverse 
selection, states will need to conduct ongoing market 
analysis of the products and prices carriers offer inside 
and outside of the exchange (see Exhibit 1).
Many of the activities listed in Exhibit 1 relate to 
the exchange’s determination of whether a particular 
insurer meets all of the requirements for participation. 
Exhibit 1: Plan Management Activities for Health Insurance Exchanges
Plan Management Activity Description
Confirm state licensure and 
solvency
The exchange must confirm that QHPs are licensed and “in good standing” in the state in 
which they are offering coverage.
Certify QHPs The exchange must certify that QHPs meet a minimum set of criteria related to provider 
network, marketing practices, quality, and transparency.
Review justifications of rate 
increases
The exchange must review QHPs’ justifications for rate increases before any rate increases are 
implemented. The exchange must also take into consideration any recommendations from 
its state DOI regarding such rate increases, and take the information into account before 
approving a QHP for participation.
Manage a selective contracting 
process (where applicable)
The exchange must ensure that each QHP’s participation is “in the interests of” consumers and 
small businesses. Some may engage in a selective contracting process in order to meet that goal.
Monitor premium growth in 
and outside of the exchange
The exchange must track and assess premium growth among participating and non-
participating plans.
Review rating and benefits The exchange must ensure that QHPs are complying with the ACA’s rating restrictions and 
requirements for the value and scope of benefits (often referred to as the “precious metal” tiers 
and essential health benefits package).
Assign plan ratings The exchange must assign QHPs a rating based on price and quality, according to a rating 
methodology devised by HHS. The exchange will need to post that rating on its web portal.10 
Recertify QHPs The exchange must have a process in place for renewing QHPs that wish to continue 
participating.
Monitor QHPs In addition to an annual or multi-year recertification process, the exchange must engage in 
ongoing oversight of QHPs to ensure ongoing compliance with exchange requirements.
Decertify QHPs The exchange will have the authority to decertify a QHP that is no longer meeting exchange 
standards. HHS has also clarified that exchanges will have the ability to impose intermediate 
sanctions for noncompliance that fall short of full decertification.
Manage an appeals process for 
QHPs
The exchange will need to manage an appeals process for decertified QHPs.
Promote transparency QHPs must report a wide range of data to the exchange, including financial disclosures, 
enrollment and disenrollment figures, and number of denied claims. The exchange must 
provide consumers with a web portal that enables comparisons based on plans’ benefits and 
cost-sharing, performance on consumer satisfaction surveys, medical loss ratio, and provider 
networks.
Sources:  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 
(hereinafter “ACA”) §§ 1302(b), 1311(d), (e); 45 CFR §§ 155.1000, 155.1020, 155.205, 155.1075, 155.1010, 155.1080, 
155.1040, 156.220.
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Others focus on the ongoing oversight and consumer 
protection that exchanges must provide to ensure that 
plans, once initially certified, continue to serve the 
interests of enrollees. For purposes of this report, we 
focus primarily on those activities most closely aligned 
with what regulators do today to determine whether 
insurers and their products are compliant with state and 
federal standards. Specifically, we evaluate the following 
functions, as performed by DOIs, state Medicaid agencies 
or Departments of Health, and CMS, for Medicare 
Advantage plans:
  • Licensing and solvency
  • Network adequacy
  • Benefit and rate review
  • Marketing
  • Quality improvement
  • Ongoing oversight
HHS, in its final rule on the establishment of exchanges, 
recognizes that states have experience in performing such 
functions and gives states flexibility to draw on existing 
Exhibit 2: Minimum Certification Requirements for QHPs
Certification Standard Description
State licensed QHPs must be licensed and “in good standing” in each state in which they’re offering coverage. 
This means the insurer cannot be subject to any outstanding sanctions from the state’s DOI.
Accredited QHPs must be accredited with respect to local performance on clinical quality measures such 
as HEDIS®, as well as consumer access, utilization management, quality assurance, provider 
credentialing, complaints and appeals, network adequacy and access, and patient information 
programs by a third party accrediting entity, as designated by the Secretary. QHPs that are not 
accredited at the time of certification must become accredited within a timeframe established by 
the exchange.
Adequate network QHPs must provide enrollees with a sufficient choice of providers and make their provider 
directory available to consumers. QHPs must further ensure services are available without 
“unreasonable delay.” 
Access to essential 
community providers
QHPs must include within their network community providers that serve predominantly low-
income, medically underserved individuals.
Fair marketing practices QHPs must meet marketing requirements, as determined by the exchange. They cannot employ 
marketing practices or benefit designs that effectively discourage enrollment by individuals with 
significant health care needs.
Quality improvement 
strategy
QHPs must implement a quality improvement strategy that uses provider reimbursement or other 
incentives to improve health outcomes, prevent hospital readmissions, improve patient safety and 
implement wellness programs.
Report on rates and benefits QHPs must submit rate and benefit information to the exchange, and provide a justification for 
a rate increase prior to the implementation of the increase. The justification must also be posted 
prominently on the QHP’s website.
Data reporting QHPs must report to HHS, exchanges, state DOIs, and the public data on:
• Claims payment policies and practices;
• Financial disclosures;
• Enrollment and disenrollment;
• Number of denied claims;
• Rating practices;
• Cost-sharing and payments for any out-of-network coverage;
• New enrollee rights under the ACA; and
•  Cost-sharing information for a particular item or service, upon the request of an enrollee.
Offer minimum essential 
health benefits and meet 
Bronze, Silver, Gold or 
Platinum actuarial value 
targets
All new plans in the individual and small group markets, including QHPs, must abide by the 
ACA’s rating restrictions and requirements for the value and scope of benefits, often referred to as 
the “precious metal” tiers and essential health benefits package. Participating carriers must offer at 
least one silver level and one gold level QHP in the exchange.
Sources: ACA §§ 1301, 1311(c), 1311(g); 45 C.F.R. §§ 155.1040, 155.1045, 155.405, 156.200 156.210, 156.220, 156.230
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standards and procedures. This is particularly true for the 
minimum certification requirements for QHPs (see Exhibit 
2). As HHS notes, “we continue to believe that States are 
best equipped to adapt the minimum Exchange functions 
to their local markets….States already have significant 
experience performing many of the key functions.”11
Though true for many states, such experience may not 
exist within a single agency or apply across all markets, 
entities, or products. For example, at least 20 states 
impose network adequacy requirements on managed care 
plans such as HMOs.12 Others require commercial plans 
to implement quality assurance programs and report 
on health plan quality metrics, such as the Healthcare 
Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS®) and 
the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and 
Systems (CAHPS®). However, in a number of states 
these requirements are regulated not by the DOI but 
by a separate agency, such as a DOH or department of 
managed care.13 And most states limit these requirements 
to closed network plans or HMOs. 
To address these limitations, states may want the exchange 
to partner with other agencies such as the DOI, DOH, 
or Medicaid agency. Plan management activities do not 
need to be performed exclusively by a state’s exchange. In 
its final rule, HHS makes clear that exchanges can enter 
into agreements with other state agencies to perform plan 
management so long as the exchange retains “ultimate 
accountability” for certification and review of QHPs.14 
At a minimum, the DOI can confirm that a QHP is 
licensed and in good standing. In addition, most state 
DOIs have existing authority to review and approve (or 
disapprove) health insurance policy forms before they are 
marketed, as well as authority to review insurers’ rates. 
And regardless of how an exchange is organized in a state, 
the DOI will retain key oversight functions for plans 
inside and outside of exchanges. In addition, as noted 
by Bachrach and colleagues in their recent paper, state 
exchanges could leverage the plan management experience 
of their state Medicaid agencies, many of whom have been 
setting eligibility and reporting standards and managing 
contracts with Medicaid managed care organizations 
(MCOs) for decades.15
The ACA’s requirements for initial QHP certification will 
also require the exchange or a delegated entity like the 
DOI to collect and evaluate an unprecedented amount of 
plan data (see Exhibit 2). To collect, manage and use this 
data to make appropriate decisions about plans’ ability 
to participate in exchanges, state officials responsible 
for plan management will need to rely on IT-based data 
management and sharing programs. Efforts to build such 
programs are already underway, such as the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioner’s (NAIC) System 
for Electronic Rate and Form Filing (SERFF) project 
to upgrade their centralized filing system to meet the 
expanded data collection and review requirements of 
exchange plan management.16
Effective collaboration across state agencies, some of 
whom may have no past history of working together, 
will likely require the commitment and leadership of top 
political officials within the state. In recognition of this 
need for interagency partnership, some state exchanges 
have already entered into or are exploring agreements that 
delineate the functions to be performed by the insurance 
department and the flow of information among carriers, 
the DOI, and the exchange. For example, New Mexico’s 
exchange planners have delegated to the DOI the 
certification of QHPs, monitoring ongoing compliance, 
data collection to meet the ACA’s transparency 
requirements, review of essential health benefits, and 
determination of actuarial value. The DOI will also 
be responsible for assessing the market to evaluate the 
potential for adverse selection.17 Presumably, however, 
New Mexico’s exchange leadership must have the final say 
on a QHP’s participation and ongoing suitability in order 
to comply with HHS’ rule that it maintain “ultimate 
accountability” for plan management.
Yet, even when done in partnership with other state 
agencies, exchanges’ plan management responsibilities 
represent a considerable expansion of states’ regulatory 
oversight over insurers. As one commentator put it, 
“This isn’t your grandma’s rate review any more.”18 The 
new oversight requirements could require states to enact 
expanded regulatory authority for the agency responsible, 
and allocate the necessary resources to expand their 
IT and staff capacity. For example, many states do not 
currently have network adequacy standards for private 
health insurers in their state codes. Fewer still require 
private health insurers to implement and report on quality 
improvement activities. And, with the exception of 
Massachusetts, we could find no state that currently sets 
minimum requirements for a plan’s actuarial value.
In recognition of this need for interagency 
partnership, some state exchanges have 
already entered into or are exploring 
agreements that delineate the functions to 
be performed by the insurance department.
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Furthermore, much of the current state regulation of 
commercial insurers is done post-market, in response to 
complaints or as part of an auditing process (often called 
“market conduct” examinations). Going forward, the 
entity ultimately responsible for plan management will 
need to balance requirements for greater front-end review 
of carriers and plans with the need to develop an oversight 
process that attracts an adequate mix of carriers to the 
exchange. This will be particularly true for the SHOP 
exchange, in which there are limited incentives for health 
plans to participate. For the individual market exchange, 
which is the only avenue through which plans can access 
federal premium subsidies, the incentives to participate 
are stronger and plans will be less deterred by a robust 
review and approval process. 
For states with an FFE in which CMS is responsible 
for plan management, there may need to be an 
accommodation between regulation and oversight as it 
has traditionally been done in the private market, and 
the standards and processes CMS has had in place to 
manage commercial plans in Medicare Advantage. This is 
in part for pragmatic reasons: in designing and building 
an FFE, CMS will likely not have the resources to tailor 
plan management to suit each state’s regulatory standards 
and culture. However, the agency has fifteen years of 
experience and a well-developed infrastructure to assess 
and oversee the performance of commercial health plans 
in the Medicare program.
Plan management in exchanges, whether or not done 
in coordination with other State regulatory agencies, 
or performed exclusively by federal regulators, will face 
heightened public scrutiny, and an overall shift in the 
level of accountability. In many respects, the success and 
long term viability of exchanges rests on the effective 
execution of plan management. And because federal 
premium subsidies are at stake, taxpayers will expect value 
for the dollars spent.
Current State and Federal Experience with Plan Management
Federal and state regulators take a range of approaches 
to their interactions with health insurance carriers, 
from hands-on contract management to more limited 
regulatory oversight. The regulatory approach chosen 
by the state or federal entity stems largely from their 
mission and statutory mandate, as well as the political 
environment in which they operate. In the Medicare 
program, for example, CMS acts as a steward of federal 
tax dollars by managing contracts with Medicare 
Advantage plans in order to protect beneficiaries, improve 
quality and ensure compliance with applicable guidance, 
regulations, and statutes. Similarly, state Medicaid 
agencies must act as stewards of federal and state tax 
dollars by managing contracts with managed care plans to 
increase access to care, improve quality and reduce costs 
in the Medicaid program.19
The role and approach of the state agencies responsible 
for regulating commercial health insurance tends to be 
very different. Unlike their sister Medicaid agencies, 
DOIs are not stewards of tax subsidies, and do not enter 
into contractual relationships with the health plans 
they regulate. And while the DOI’s mission statements 
generally encompass consumer protection, most of the 
DOI mission statements we reviewed require them to 
also “ensure a competitive insurance environment” 
(Wisconsin), “encourage economic development,” 
(Arizona), or provide “efficient” oversight (Tennessee).20 
State insurance regulators must balance two jobs: first, 
to protect the public and second, to help insurance 
companies bring products to market in a timely and 
efficient manner. 
In many respects, “plan management” is just not what 
DOIs do. Yet the ACA envisions a considerable expansion 
of state regulatory oversight of health insurers, particularly 
QHPs participating in insurance exchanges. Thus, the 
law requires exchanges to engage in oversight that in some 
cases expands on what many state DOIs already do but in 
other cases represents a wholly new activity. 
Below we discuss generally how state DOIs oversee 
insurance companies, and discuss how six states (Arizona, 
Minnesota, New York, Tennessee, Washington, and 
Wisconsin) perform oversight on five key areas related 
to exchange plan management: network adequacy, 
marketing, quality improvement, rate and benefit review, 
and ongoing oversight.
We then compare the DOIs’ regulatory activities to the 
plan management activities performed by state Medicaid 
agency officials, as described by Bachrach and colleagues, 
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and our review of CMS’ oversight of plans participating 
in the Medicare Advantage program.
DOIs are responsible for regulating the business of health 
insurance, with the exception of self-insured group 
health insurance. As noted above, they don’t enter into 
contracts with insurers or “manage” them in any way. 
Fundamentally, state regulators are responsible for ensuring 
the financial solvency of insurance companies, enforcing 
minimum state standards for competition, and protecting 
consumers against fraud.21 DOIs execute this responsibility 
by licensing entities that bear insurance risk and reviewing 
and approving the rates and policy forms for health plan 
products. They are often under very tight timelines for 
conducting the reviews. For example, most DOIs must 
make a determination on rates and policy forms within 
30 to 60 days or the filing is “deemed’ approved.22 Once 
products are being sold to individuals and groups, DOIs 
review companies’ behavior to assess compliance with state 
laws and provide assistance to consumers or employers that 
have complaints about their coverage. 
In Medicaid, state agencies have expanded their oversight 
role as Medicaid managed care programs have grown 
in scope and size. As of October 2010, 36 states were 
contracting with risk-based managed care organizations 
to provide health care services to Medicaid beneficiaries.23 
Plans seeking to participate in Medicaid managed care 
must meet both federal and state requirements. Federal 
requirements set minimum standards for all plans and 
state rules and contracting standards can build on those.24 
As a result, states vary considerably in their approach to 
contracting and the ongoing oversight of plans.
For plans seeking to participate in Medicare Advantage, 
they can expect a formal application, review and approval 
process that takes place over a timeframe of over a year.25 
For example, in order to enroll beneficiaries by January 
2013, a health insurance company would have had to 
submit its Notice of Intent to Apply (NOIA) to CMS 
by November of 2011.26 While CMS provides detailed 
application instructions for plans, and encourages them 
to take advantage of opportunities to obtain training on 
CMS systems and procedures, companies that submit an 
incomplete or noncompliant application may have their 
applications denied. Unlike state DOIs, CMS officials 
face no statutory “deemer” provision that deems a plan 
approved for participation if they don’t act within a 
statutory time frame. 
Licensing and solvency. For private health insurance, 
at the licensing stage, companies must apply for a 
“certificate of authority” (COA) from the state. As part 
of that process, they must submit information on the 
company’s officers and business plan, as well as detailed 
financial information. Analysts within the DOI review 
the financial and governance information about the 
company and conduct background checks. All states 
require health insurance companies to be financially 
solvent and capable of paying claims. If a company is 
approved, it receives a COA to conduct business in the 
state.27 While there is often no formal renewal process 
for a COA, companies are required to file financial 
information with the DOI on a regular basis. Although 
information about which companies have COAs 
to operate in a state is public information, ongoing 
investigations or penalties imposed on an insurer may not 
be made public. 
Medicaid MCOs are generally required by federal 
regulation to meet state solvency standards for 
commercial, non-Medicaid HMOs or be licensed or 
certified by the state as a risk-bearing entity (with some 
exceptions). In a recent survey, the majority of states 
indicated they require Medicaid MCOs to be licensed as 
HMOs, with a few exceptions. For example, two states 
(Arizona and Maryland) indicated they have no licensing 
requirements, and six states allow exemptions from 
solvency requirements.28
For Medicare Advantage plans, CMS generally relies 
on state insurance regulators to determine financial 
solvency.29 Medicare Advantage Organizations (MAOs) 
must be state licensed and meet state financial solvency 
standards.30
Discussion. To participate in the insurance exchanges 
under the ACA, QHPs must be licensed and “in good 
standing” with state insurance departments. HHS has 
interpreted “good standing” to mean the insurer is not 
subject to any outstanding sanctions from the state DOI. 
While the final rule does not define what it means for a 
carrier to be sanctioned, states use a range of enforcement 
tools, such as letters that raise concerns, corrective 
action plans, civil monetary penalties, and rescinding 
a carrier’s COA.31 It is unclear whether each of these 
actions would constitute a sanction that would erase a 
plan’s “good standing” with a state. Also, while carriers’ 
COAs are public information, other enforcement actions 
As a result, states vary considerably in their 
approach to contracting and the ongoing 
oversight of plans.
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are often not publicly disclosed. Exchanges could collect 
information on plans’ status from the DOI, or they could 
require carriers to attest to their status as part of their 
QHP applications. Without further detail from HHS, 
exchanges can presumably decide for themselves what 
enforcement actions constitute a “sanction.” For FFEs 
operated by CMS, the agency can check public databases 
for companies’ COA status, but will either need the 
cooperation of the state DOI to determine whether an 
insurer is subject to any enforcement actions or require 
carriers to attest to their good standing.
Network adequacy. A number of states require 
private health insurance carriers to meet network 
adequacy requirements as a condition of receiving an 
HMO license. Seven states have adopted the NAIC’s 
Managed Care Network Adequacy Model Act, which 
requires managed care plans to “maintain a network that 
is sufficient in numbers and types of providers to assure 
that all services to covered persons will be accessible 
without unreasonable delay.”32 Another 13 states have 
adopted similar laws establishing an adequacy standard 
for network-based plans.33 Of the states we reviewed, 
only Washington requires all carriers to meet network 
adequacy requirements. Regulators review plans based 
on both quantitative and subjective standards to ensure 
networks are broad and deep enough to provide for timely 
services.34 Arizona, Minnesota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin 
apply their network adequacy standards only to HMOs or 
closed network plans; in Minnesota and Tennessee it is the 
DOH’s responsibility, not the DOI’s, to ensure compliance 
with such standards.35 All five states review network 
adequacy when the carrier is seeking their HMO license. 
New York has also bifurcated its regulation of network-
based health plans. The DOH reviews network adequacy 
for HMOs, while the Department of Financial Services 
(DFS) sets and enforces standards for traditional insurers 
with network-based products (such as preferred provider 
organizations, or PPOs).36 In general, while the DOH 
reviews network adequacy at the time a carrier seeks an 
HMO license or a geographic area expansion, the DFS’ 
review of network adequacy takes place at the product level, 
when a carrier is seeking approval to market a network-
based product. During the review process, New York’s 
DFS and DOH discuss any problems or concerns about 
the adequacy of the network with the company and the 
company is allowed to make changes. Because the agencies’ 
concerns are usually resolved during this process, it is 
rare for an HMO or PPO product to have its application 
formally rejected because of a network adequacy problem.37 
However, the DOH continues to monitor the adequacy of 
HMO networks through annual reviews.
Medicaid MCOs must meet a mix of federal and state 
requirements. Federal regulations provide detailed 
definitions of broad statutory protections that ensure all 
covered services are available and accessible to enrollees. 
Federal rules interpret those protections to ensure services 
are always available when medically necessary. State 
contracts build on the federal rules with more detailed 
standards for availability and access, including enrollee-
to-provider ratios, travel time and distance to providers, 
appointment availability standards, and, in some cases, 
in-office wait times for appointments. For example, 
Tennessee prohibits travel time and distance to primary 
care providers exceeding 30 miles or 30 minutes in rural 
areas and 20 miles or 30 minutes in urban areas. New York 
has similar time/distance standards and requires plans to 
assign no more than 1,500 enrollees to each physician.38
In Medicare Advantage, all MAOs must maintain adequate 
networks of providers to serve beneficiaries.39 Before their 
plan bid can be accepted, MAOs must attest that they have 
a network of contracted providers and facilities that meets 
the required access standards (which, similar to Medicaid, 
include enrollee to provider ratios and time/distance 
standards) and submit a “Health Service Delivery Table” 
to CMS.40 CMS then reviews the network against specific 
provider types, as well as time and distance standards 
based on specific geographic criteria of the county.41 The 
standard varies depending on the MAO’s proposed service 
area (i.e., rural vs. urban), and MAOs can seek exceptions 
if their network in a specific county for specific provider 
types receives a failing grade. In addition, MAOs must 
submit a sample of their actual provider contracts to CMS. 
While the agency reviews a subset of the contracts at the 
time of application, they monitor beneficiary access to care 
on an ongoing basis and may audit contracts to ensure 
networks are adequate.42
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Discussion. Under the ACA, QHPs must meet network 
adequacy standards to be eligible to participate in an 
exchange. While HHS has set a standard requiring QHPs 
to provide access to services “without unreasonable delay,” 
states may expand on this general standard.43 Whether 
responsibility rests with the exchange, a state DOI or 
DOH, or CMS, the assessment of network adequacy will 
need to be done before an insurer can be certified as a QHP. 
Where a state does not currently have a network adequacy 
standard for commercial plans, the exchange could rely 
on the general “unreasonable delay” standard proposed by 
HHS, or they could import some or all of the standards 
used for Medicaid MCOs. At a minimum, however, 
state officials should consider aligning network adequacy 
standards so that they apply equally to plans both inside 
and outside the exchange in order to limit the potential 
for adverse selection.44
For an FFE run by CMS, the agency could require carriers 
to attest that their networks meet the state standard, or 
if none exists, the “without unreasonable delay” standard 
articulated by HHS. For a more proactive review, they 
could leverage the process used in Medicare Advantage, 
in which plans must submit their networks to a system 
that checks against a default standard and delivers a pass 
or fail grade for each provider/facility type in each specific 
county. Further, if CMS’ Medicare Advantage system 
is upgraded to allow for network adequacy submissions 
from QHP applicants, CMS may want to make the 
system available for use by states that are performing plan 
management functions under a partnership arrangement. 
CMS would, however, need to account for the fact that 
Medicare Advantage standards for time and distance 
reflect the needs of an over-65 population, which may be 
different than the needs of enrollees in the exchanges.
Beyond network adequacy, an exchange will want to 
assess whether its participating QHPs, taken together, can 
provide adequate service to all of the exchange’s potential 
enrollees, regardless of where they reside in the state. 
In other words, assuming the exchange serves residents 
statewide, it will need to attract and retain a sufficient mix 
of plans to ensure that all eligible enrollees in the state are 
served by at least one QHP.  
Benefit and rate review. Most, but not all, state DOIs 
review and approve insurers’ policy forms before a product 
can be sold. A policy form is the representative document 
that defines the contractual relationship between the 
insurer and its enrollees and typically lists the policy’s 
benefits and restrictions.45 DOI reviewers check to ensure 
the form complies with state and federal standards, 
including notice provisions and any required benefit 
mandates. In most states a form cannot be used unless 
it has been approved by the DOI.46 Of the six states we 
reviewed, all review insurers’ forms to ensure they include 
required state benefit mandates. In addition, New York’s 
form review includes an assessment of whether HMOs are 
meeting guidelines for maximum enrollee cost sharing.47
In roughly two-thirds of states, DOIs also have the 
authority to review and approve premium rates before 
they are implemented.48 Under the ACA, in order to 
have an “effective” rate review process, the DOI must 
receive sufficient data from health insurers to adequately 
examine whether a proposed rate increase is reasonable. 
The examination must consider medical cost trends, 
changes in utilization, benefits and cost sharing, changes 
in the risk profile of enrollees, reserves, administrative 
costs, taxes and fees, medical loss ratio, and the insurer’s 
capital and surplus.49 The state must have a standard for 
determining whether a proposed rate is reasonable, and 
the DOI must post either rate filings or justifications on 
its website (or post to the preliminary justifications that 
appear on the CMS website). States must also provide 
for a public process to review and comment on proposed 
rate increases. CMS has determined that forty-four states 
and the District of Columbia have effective rate review 
programs in at least one insurance market.50 Conversely, 
a small number of state DOIs do not currently have any 
authority to require certain insurers to submit a rate filing, 
or can only review filings in one insurance market.51
Of the six states we reviewed, only Arizona’s rate review 
program was deemed “not effective” by HHS. Since that 
designation, the Arizona DOI had begun a rulemaking 
process intended to bring Arizona into compliance with 
HHS’ effective rate review standards.52 Washington and 
Wisconsin’s rate review programs were deemed only 
partially effective because they do not fully review coverage 
sold through associations.53 HHS is thus reviewing 
proposed rate increases for all of Arizona’s individual and 
small group markets and for a number of policies sold 
through associations in Washington and Wisconsin.
For states that have adopted rate restrictions in the 
individual and or small group markets, the rate review 
process can also include an assessment of whether a plan’s 
In general, most state DOIs attempt to 
resolve concerns about insurers’ rate and 
policy form filings before having to issue a 
formal disapproval.
Issues for State, Partnership and Federally Facilitated Health Insurance Exchanges 11
rate is in compliance with those restrictions. For example, 
small group insurers in Wisconsin are subject to rate bands, 
such that rates cannot vary more than 30 percent above 
or below the midpoint rate.54 As part of Wisconsin’s rate 
review process, the Office of the Insurance Commissioner 
will typically check the carrier’s filing to confirm that it 
meets this statutory requirement.55 Under the ACA, DOIs 
will need to review rate filings in the individual and small 
group markets to ensure they are in compliance with the 
new rating restrictions in the law, which prohibit health 
status underwriting and allow rates to vary only based on 
age, tobacco use, family status, and geography.56
In general, most state DOIs attempt to resolve concerns 
about insurers’ rate and policy form filings before having 
to issue a formal disapproval. This can be an iterative 
process, involving written and oral communications 
between the regulator and the insurer. Often, the 
statutory review deadlines are tolled while insurers 
respond to the DOI’s questions or requests.
For Medicaid MCOs, rates are set through a procurement 
process that is governed by both federal and state rules. 
States generally use two different approaches to setting 
rates for Medicaid MCOs: administrative pricing, in 
which the state sets the capitation rate and plans decide 
whether or not to apply for participation in the program, 
and competitive bidding, in which states issue a request 
for proposals and judge plan bids based on their proposed 
rates and services.57 After rates are set, an actuary must 
certify the rates as actuarially sound. States must then 
submit their rates and rate-setting methodology to CMS 
for review and approval in order to receive federal funding 
for their Medicaid managed care program.58
In addition, Medicaid MCO contracts stipulate the 
benefits that must be covered by the plan. If a benefit is 
covered by Medicaid but not listed in the contract, then 
it must be covered by the Medicaid agency, outside the 
capitated rate paid to the plans.59
CMS uses a formal bidding process for plans offered by 
MAOs. Once a MAO is approved for participation, it 
must then submit bids for any plans it intends to offer. 
One goal of the bid review process is to conserve taxpayer 
resources by ensuring that any payments above plan costs 
are returned to beneficiaries in the form of lower out-of-
pocket costs or better benefits. A second key goal is to 
protect beneficiaries against health status discrimination 
through plan benefit design.60 The contracting and 
oversight process for MAOs is dictated in large part by 
Congress, which has laid out numerous requirements for 
participating plans.
The bids must include a description of the plan’s benefits 
(including any supplemental benefits beyond those 
offered in traditional Medicare) as well as the amount 
of the proposed premium and any beneficiary cost 
sharing.61 CMS reviews the plan bids for appropriateness 
of pricing as well as benefit design.62 In recent years, 
CMS has discouraged the proliferation of “look alike” 
products that made beneficiaries’ selection of plans 
unnecessarily complicated.63 If a MAO’s offerings are not 
“meaningfully different” in a particular geographic areas, 
CMS will encourage the MAO to modify their offerings 
or consolidate into fewer plans. This policy grew out of 
complaints from beneficiaries that they were confused 
by the profusion of products, many very similar to each 
other, offered by the same insurer.
CMS also reviews both the overall benefit package to 
assess actuarial equivalence of cost sharing with the 
traditional Medicare benefit package and actuarial 
equivalence within specific benefit categories, including 
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renal dialysis, skilled nursing facility care, chemotherapy, 
durable medical equipment and Medicare Part B drugs.64 
To perform this review, CMS has authority to examine 
detailed information about the plans’ benefits and cost 
sharing, but also relies on signed actuarial certifications 
submitted by the MAO. If CMS does find problems, 
MAOs are typically given an opportunity to negotiate or 
modify their original submissions.
Discussion. The ACA includes sweeping reforms that 
address the adequacy and affordability of coverage, 
including requirements that new individual and small 
group plans provide a minimum benefit package, meet 
prescribed targets for the actuarial value of the plan 
(Bronze, Silver, Gold, Platinum), and eliminate rating that 
discriminates based on health status. These reforms apply to 
individual and small group plans, regardless of whether they 
participate in state exchanges. However, exchange officials 
are ultimately responsible for ensuring that participating 
QHPs have met all federal and state requirements for 
essential benefits, actuarial value, and rates.
In the majority of states, DOIs have experience reviewing 
policy forms for compliance with state benefit mandates, 
and exchange officials can look to them for expertise 
on whether QHPs’ offerings include a required set of 
benefits. However, state DOIs will also need to assess 
whether plans – inside and outside of exchanges – are 
complying with actuarial equivalence standards within 
or across benefit categories,65 as well as the ACA’s 
provisions barring plans from using benefit design to 
discriminate against high risk individuals.66 Generally, 
state DOIs do not have experience reviewing benefit 
packages for actuarial equivalence against a benchmark, 
or determining whether a particular benefit design 
discriminates against higher risk individuals. Also new 
to state DOIs will be the determination of whether plans 
are meeting the actuarial value tiers prescribed in the 
ACA. Many states will need to build this capacity, by, 
for example, hiring or contracting with health actuaries. 
A review and approval process that is more onerous for 
QHPs than for non-participating plans may result in 
higher premiums inside the exchange or reduce carriers’ 
incentive to participate.
CMS has experience assessing MAO bids to determine 
the scope of benefits, as well as whether the benefits 
covered in specified categories are actuarially equivalent to 
coverage under traditional Medicare. Further, the agency 
reviews bids to guard against the use of benefit design 
to discriminate against high risk beneficiaries. However, 
CMS does not currently have the resources and staff to 
perform this kind of review in states with FFEs and may 
need, at least to some extent, to rely either on attestations 
by plans or cooperation with state DOIs. 
The ACA also requires exchanges to review QHPs’ 
justifications for rate increases before such increases are 
implemented. The exchange must take into consideration 
any recommendations from its DOI regarding rate 
increases. Most state exchanges will likely rely on the 
findings of their DOI regarding carriers’ rates, in order 
to leverage the existing staff and expertise within those 
agencies, and avoid duplication of effort. However, for 
states that do not currently have authority to collect and 
review rate filings for certain carriers or certain markets, 
it is unclear how their exchange will fulfill the ACA 
requirement. Ideally, the state will confer on the DOI 
the necessary authority to review filings of all carriers in 
the individual and small group markets, whether inside 
or outside the exchange. If CMS is performing the plan 
management function for the exchange, it will either have 
to review rate increase justifications itself or rely on DOIs. 
It is currently conducting rate review in eighteen states for 
at least one market or for association products, but would 
have to expand its capacity to perform the necessary 
review for FFEs.
Marketing regulation. Virtually all states have enacted 
a version of the NAIC’s model Unfair Trade Practices Act 
(UTPA).67 The law confers upon the DOI the authority 
to regulate private health insurers’ marketing materials 
and practices to protect consumers against “unfair” and 
“deceptive” acts and the false advertising of insurance 
policies. In addition, 48 states have enacted the NAIC’s 
model state regulation to constrain health insurers’ 
advertising practices.68 The regulation establishes specific 
parameters for the “clear and truthful disclosure of the 
benefits, limitations and exclusions” of individual and 
group health insurance policies. While all states also set 
standards for the conduct of insurance producers (health 
plan agents and brokers), we did not include this element 
of marketing regulation in our review. 
…state DOIs will also need to assess whether 
plans – inside and outside of exchanges – 
are complying with actuarial equivalence 
standards within or across benefit 
categories, as well as the ACA’s provisions 
barring plans from using benefit design to 
discriminate against high risk individuals.
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Of the six states we reviewed, none conduct a 
comprehensive prior assessment of plans’ marketing 
materials before they are used. While Arizona reviews 
some marketing materials for compliance with the 
UTPA and the advertising regulation if the insurers 
submit the materials to the DOI at least 15 days before 
they’re used, the Department does not currently have 
staff in place to perform this review for more than about 
half of the advertising filings it receives. Arizona also 
assesses compliance in response to complaints or as part 
of a market conduct exam.69 Tennessee and Wisconsin 
generally do not conduct any prior review or approval 
of marketing materials, but will assess compliance in 
response to complaints or as part of a market conduct 
exam.70 New York’s DOH does review marketing 
materials of commercial HMOs, but this is typically 
limited to ensuring that the materials are accurate and 
factual.71 Both Washington and Minnesota review 
marketing materials under the UTPA but apply more 
detailed standards to HMOs.72
Medicaid managed care companies’ (MMC) marketing 
materials and activities are governed by a mix of federal 
regulations, state regulation and contracting requirements. 
The rules are an outgrowth of the marketing abuses 
seen in the early stages of MMC implementation and in 
some cases are highly prescriptive. Federal rules require 
prior approval of all marketing materials and address 
both the content of the materials and the method of 
distribution. Marketing materials cannot contain false 
or misleading information and must provide individuals 
with information in a format and language that is easily 
understood. Federal rules also prohibit unsolicited 
personal contact (i.e., door-to-door marketing and cold 
calls), and require marketing materials be distributed 
throughout the plan’s service area.73 
As recently documented by Bachrach and colleagues, 
state rules further define how and to whom plans can 
market and set more detailed rules for marketing material 
and permissible activities. For example, Arizona requires 
materials to be reapproved every two years or after any 
modification. New York requires MMCs to submit 
a detailed plan for all proposed activities during the 
contract period, and Minnesota requires materials to 
be understandable to a person who reads at a 7th grade 
level and printed in at least 10-point-font. Some states 
go beyond the federal requirement that all materials be 
distributed throughout the plan’s service area to stipulate 
permitted locations for distribution. New York rules 
include a full list of allowable locations, including schools 
and community centers. Wisconsin allows materials to 
be distributed in participating provider offices as long as 
all plans with which the provider contracts are allowed to 
distribute their materials.74
For Medicare Advantage, CMS’ review of plans’ 
communications with enrollees and prospective enrollees 
has evolved, and Congress has enacted new standards 
and enforcement authority in response to concerns 
about marketing abuses in the program. The Social 
Security Act and implementing regulations take a broad 
view of what constitutes “marketing” for purposes of 
Medicare Advantage.75 Essentially, marketing materials 
are any informational materials or activities directed at 
Medicare beneficiaries. And, as with Medicaid, certain 
marketing activities, such as unsolicited personal contacts, 
are prohibited. CMS reviews everything from written 
communications to radio or television advertising to 
face-to-face sales. MAOs must file all marketing materials 
with CMS, and some may be subject to “prior approval” 
before they can be used. Most materials, however, fall 
into a “file and use” category, meaning that CMS does 
not need to formally approve them before MAOs can 
use them although the agency can disapprove them 
retroactively. CMS is moving increasingly towards the 
file and use approach and staff are doing fewer front-
end reviews of marketing materials.76 The agency also 
provides plans with template language they can use in 
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their communications with beneficiaries. If they do so, the 
language is deemed approved.
CMS has also implemented a “secret shopper” program, 
in which CMS personnel conduct surveillance of plans’ 
marketing activities. Plans are required to submit an 
advance schedule of all their marketing events to CMS, 
but agency personnel will also review local newspapers 
and media outlets for any announcements of sales events 
that plans did not report in advance. Staff will then 
attend these events undercover to monitor and report any 
improper sales techniques.77
Discussion. Under the ACA, exchanges must certify that 
QHPs meet marketing standards, and do not employ 
marketing practices that discriminate against high risk 
individuals.78 HHS’ final rule for exchange certification 
indicates deference to states’ own marketing standards, 
and expressly rejects requests to import standards from 
Medicare Advantage.79
State exchanges will likely need to coordinate with their 
state DOI to determine a common marketing standard, 
and the existing state standard may need to be modified 
to include the prohibition against discrimination against 
high risk individuals. In addition, because few state DOIs 
appear to review and pre-approve marketing materials, 
exchanges will need to decide whether they will conduct 
this kind of review as part of the QHP certification 
process. If they do, this could be done by exchange staff 
or through a contract with the state DOI or Medicaid 
agency. Based on our review of state practices, it is likely 
that the Medicaid agency has an existing process and 
infrastructure for reviewing and approving marketing 
materials, unlike many state DOIs.
CMS, in operating a FFE, will need to strike a balance 
between establishing meaningful consumer marketing 
protections and encouraging carrier participation in the 
exchange. Unlike Medicare, which is the only viable 
market for individuals over 65, the FFE will not be the 
exclusive market for individual and small group coverage 
in a state. Thus, as CMS officials consider appropriate 
marketing standards and a review process for the FFE, they 
will want to consider each state’s regulatory environment, 
to the extent they have the resources and capacity to do 
so. While the review of marketing materials and activities 
is but one factor for an insurer to consider in deciding 
whether to participate in the FFE, insurers will be more 
likely to do so if CMS can offer them a level playing field 
compared to insurers who choose not to participate.  
Exchanges, whether state- or federally run, could use a 
range of approaches for determining compliance with 
marketing standards, from relying solely on plans’ self-at-
testation to requiring plans to undergo a full prior approval 
process for all marketing materials and activities. As noted 
above, both federal and state regulators are increasingly 
moving towards post-marketing enforcement of standards 
as opposed to up front reviews. However, reliance on self-
attestation alone would likely require more robust ongo-
ing oversight, particularly because the ACA’s prohibition 
on health status underwriting could lead some carriers to 
increase their use of marketing as a risk selection tool.
Quality improvement. Very few states have imposed 
quality improvement, care coordination, or performance 
reporting requirements on private health insurance plans, 
although some have imposed quality-related obligations 
on HMOs. Only two states have adopted NAIC’s Quality 
Assessment and Improvement Model Act, but many more 
(26) have adopted other, related quality improvement 
requirements for HMOs. Of the states we reviewed, 
Arizona, New York and Wisconsin require HMOs to 
have a quality improvement plan in place when they 
apply for licensure.80 Wisconsin and New York require 
HMOs to report annually on quality metrics, including 
HEDIS® and CAHPS®, and New York ranks commercial 
HMOs and Medicaid plans based on their performance. 
Minnesota requires all plans to submit encounter and 
pricing data to a third party entity, using standardized 
measures, and must establish health care homes. In 
addition, all plans in the individual and small group 
market must develop products that encourage consumers 
to use high-quality, low-cost providers.81 In contrast, 
Washington imposes no quality standards on private 
health insurance plans.82
For MMCs, federal rules require a quality assessment and 
improvement strategy that incorporates standards of access 
to and quality of care, procedures for monitoring, evaluating, 
and reporting on the quality of care, clinical practice guide-
lines, and standards for care coordination for those with 
special needs. State rules and contracting standards further 
define and in many cases go beyond those federal rules.83
Exchanges, whether state- or federally 
run, could use a range of approaches for 
determining compliance with marketing 
standards, from relying solely on plans’ self-
attestation to requiring plans to undergo a 
full prior approval process for all marketing 
materials and activities.
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All states require MMC plans to measure and report their 
performance on key measures, with the majority of states 
relying on HEDIS® and CAHPS®, and all states requiring 
that performance measurement data be validated. In 
addition, state contracts may require quality assessment 
and improvement activities to include minimum plan 
performance benchmarks and performance improvement 
goals such as improving care for those with chronic 
conditions. Bachrach’s research found that several states 
offer incentives to plans that meet performance goals 
and penalties or sanctions for those that fail to do so. For 
example, Minnesota provides incentive payments to plans 
that meet performance goals for well-child primary care, 
developmental and mental health screenings for children, 
and certain types of preventive health screenings. New 
York has a program to reward high performing plans with 
incentive payments and to disqualify poor performers 
from auto enrollment for members who do not choose a 
plan.84 And Michigan assigns MMC plans with a quality 
rating that beneficiaries can use when selecting a plan.85
In addition, all states require MMC plans to implement 
case management, care coordination or some type of 
treatment plan for enrollees with special health needs. 
For example, Wisconsin requires plans to identify women 
at high risk for poor birth outcomes and provide them 
with coordinated and continuous care. Tennessee requires 
disease management for ten specified conditions.86
In the Medicare Advantage program, all MAOs must 
have a quality improvement program that measures 
and demonstrates improvements in clinical outcomes 
and beneficiary satisfaction. The plans must also 
maintain a chronic care improvement program that 
helps beneficiaries manage chronic conditions.87 CMS 
requires MAOs to have adequate health information 
systems enabling them to collect, analyze, and report 
quality performance data, including data from HEDIS® 
and CAHPS®. In addition, CMS rates plans based on a 
5-star scale reflecting their performance on quality and 
consumer satisfaction metrics. According to observers, 
CMS has evolved from simply requiring plans to report 
on their quality activities to being fairly prescriptive 
about what those quality activities should be. In addition, 
while CMS has been providing reports to MAOs 
on their performance relative to their competitors, 
Congress has recently enacted a “pay for performance” 
program, in which plans’ payments depend in part on 
their performance on selected quality and customer 
service metrics, as measured by their star ratings.88 Low 
performing plans face the risk of having their contracts 
terminated. Observers note that this “raises the stakes”  
for the plans, and that plans have increased their emphasis 
on the activities being measured.
Discussion. While the ACA requires QHPs to implement 
and report on quality improvement strategies, HHS has 
delayed rulemaking that details specific standards and the 
information insurers will be required to report.
Few state DOIs have experience setting standards for 
quality improvement, and only a few require plans 
(primarily HMOs) to report on quality metrics. State 
exchanges may find that their Medicaid agency has more 
experience in this area. In addition, state employee benefit 
purchasing agencies often have experience working with 
health plans on quality improvement strategies.89
For FFEs operated by CMS, agency officials can look to 
Medicare Advantage for experience setting standards for 
plans, rating plans, and conducting ongoing oversight 
of plan performance. However, CMS will likely want to 
ensure that any requirements are comparable to what is 
required of them in the market outside the exchange.
Ongoing oversight. Once health insurance products 
are in the marketplace, DOIs have the authority to assess 
insurers’ conduct and ensure they remain in compliance 
with state laws. This assessment is generally done through 
market conduct exams, which include a comprehensive, 
on-site examination of the company’s policies and 
State Private Health  
Insurance Regulation
State-Federal Medicaid  
MCO Regulation
Medicare Advantage
Require quality  
improvement plan?
Varies; HMOs only Yes Yes
Require reporting  
on quality metrics?
Varies; HMOs only Yes Yes
Rate plans based  
on quality rankings?
Varies; HMOs only Varies Yes
Pay for performance? None known Varies Yes
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procedures. While some states conduct the exams on a 
multi-year cycle (i.e., every three years), others carry out 
targeted market conduct exams in response to consumer 
complaints or other evidence of problems at the company.
DOIs also use their consumer information and complaints 
systems to monitor insurer compliance with state and 
federal laws. In addition to addressing particular consumer 
complaints, state regulators use these systems to identify 
trends or problem areas for companies and products. For 
DOIs that do not conduct form or rate review before 
products are marketed, receiving complaints may be the 
only mechanism to trigger a comprehensive examination 
of the policy form or rate filings. And even for those DOIs 
that do a pre-market review, the consumer complaint 
system is an essential mechanism for regulators to learn 
about non-compliant policies and marketing practices.
When problems are found, DOIs have a range of tools 
available to them. In most cases, problems can be resolved 
informally, by notifying the company of a potential 
violation and working with them on a remedial action 
plan. Less frequently, the DOI may impose civil penalties 
on the company, issue a cease and desist order, or seek an 
injunction to stop a company from marketing a product. 
And, more rarely, a DOI may take the drastic step of 
rescinding a company’s COA.
State DOIs play another critically important function – 
they help insurers comply with the law through interpretive 
regulations and sub-regulatory guidance (i.e., bulletins, 
memoranda, notices, and instruction manuals). And 
generally, the Commissioner or senior regulators will 
communicate frequently – through in person meetings, 
telephone and e-mail – with the companies they regulate in 
order to field questions, solicit input and provide guidance.
State Medicaid agencies use a range of tools to monitor 
access to care and quality in MMC plans, including 
complaints and data collected from plans. At a minimum, 
to monitor quality, states must meet federal rules under 
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and the regulations that 
followed, but have flexibility in what they must report to 
CMS.90 For example, states must contract with external 
quality review organizations to monitor quality of care, 
and all beneficiaries are entitled to an internal appeal with 
the plan and a fair hearing with the state. In addition, 
Medicaid MCO contracts require collection and reporting 
of data such as HEDIS® and CAHPS®, which assess 
plans on measures such as controlling blood pressure, use 
of appropriate medications for people with asthma, wait 
times and appointment scheduling.91
For Medicare Advantage plans, the primary responsibility 
for oversight rests with an account manager. He or she 
draws on a range of resources to assess how the contract is 
being implemented, including complaints from enrollees 
and data from the plans’ own submissions to a centralized 
CMS database, called the Health Plan Management 
System (HPMS). Examples of the kind of data plans must 
annually report include: 
  • Frequency of procedures (i.e., number of enrollees 
receiving specified products each year)
  • Serious adverse events (i.e., number of catheter-associated 
infections, numbers of in-hospital fractures, etc.)
  • Number of grievances
  • Provider payment dispute resolution process (i.e., 
number of provider payment complaints, number of 
provider complaints resolved, etc.)
  • Agent oversight (i.e., number of agents, number of 
agents under investigation, etc.)
  • Enrollment and disenrollment data92
The account managers review this data for trends and 
outliers. To the extent problems are found, CMS may 
conduct a formal audit of a company.93
CMS has a range of enforcement tools at its disposal if 
an MAO is not performing under its contract. It can 
impose intermediate sanctions to suspend marketing and 
enrollment activities, impose civil money penalties, or 
choose not to renew a contract. If there’s a matter of grave 
concern, CMS can terminate a plan immediately.94
Discussion. State exchanges will likely want to rely 
extensively on their DOI for at least some ongoing 
oversight of QHPs. Most DOIs have a built-in 
infrastructure – consumer complaint hotlines and 
databases, an ability to identify and analyze trends, and 
staff to carry out market conduct exams, all of which 
an exchange could leverage in order to meet its required 
oversight obligations. However, not all DOIs will have 
sufficient staff and funding to conduct the robust data 
collection and oversight that will be required. The 
exchange may need to help finance a QHP oversight 
program within the DOI or build its own. At the same 
time, exchange leadership will want to assess the expertise 
and capacity of their Medicaid agency to conduct plan 
oversight, and determine areas in which they could 
benefit from collaboration. Ideally, exchange officials, 
DOI and Medicaid staff will work together to develop 
a coordinated, effective, and robust system to ensure all 
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plans, whether inside or outside exchanges, are meeting 
state standards and meeting consumers’ needs.
CMS, in its operation of an FFE, will want to rely on 
DOIs as well, particularly for information relating to 
consumer complaints about QHPs and the results of 
any market conduct exams of carriers offering QHPs. 
However, if the state is unwilling or unable to assist CMS 
in its oversight responsibilities, it will need to build the 
necessary capacity.
State officials developing the plan management function 
for health insurance exchanges will need to tackle a wide 
range of activities, both in terms of the up front review of 
insurers seeking QHP status and the ongoing oversight 
necessary to ensure that QHPs continue to meet exchange 
standards. However, exchange officials do not need to 
build a plan management infrastructure on their own. 
Within the state, whether at the DOI, DOH, or Medicaid 
agency, there likely resides an existing infrastructure for 
communicating with insurers, setting state standards 
for consumer protection, and collecting and evaluating 
data to perform oversight responsibilities. Exchanges can 
and should leverage the infrastructure and expertise that 
already exists in these agencies in order to execute the 
plan management function most efficiently.
However, plan management as contemplated under 
the ACA also represents an expansion of the regulatory 
role most state insurance regulators currently perform. 
Whether it’s assessing actuarial value, determining 
whether a particular benefit design is discriminatory, or 
establishing a network adequacy standard for plans other 
than HMOs, most state regulators will be entering new 
territory. Exchanges will have the ultimate accountability 
for delivering a high-value product to participating 
consumers and small businesses, but to do so, they may 
need to help build necessary capacity at the relevant state 
agencies, if they don’t do it themselves.
CMS, in its operation of plan management for the FFEs, 
will have an existing infrastructure it can draw upon 
– Medicare Advantage. However, there are dramatic 
differences in the regulatory approach taken by the 
agency towards the review and approval of MAOs and 
that of state insurance regulators working with private 
health insurers. While there may be efficiencies associated 
with the use of Medicare’s standards, procedures, and 
systems, CMS must balance that with the need to attract 
a sufficient number and mix of insurers to the FFE, 
particularly for the unsubsidized SHOP exchange and 
in states with concentrated insurance markets. If carriers 
perceive the process of applying for and maintaining 
QHP status to be overly burdensome, and there is 
sufficient uncertainty about the FFE’s ability to attract 
and retain a sizeable and healthy pool of enrollees, they 
may choose not to participate. 
Thus, CMS will likely want to rely on state regulators to 
help the FFE engage directly with insurers interested in 
participating in the exchange, share information and data 
about insurers’ status within a state, and, at a minimum, 
perform their conventional state role of ongoing oversight 
and consumer assistance to ensure that all insurers, 
whether inside or outside of an exchange, are meeting 
consumers’ needs.
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